CommLawBlog : Broadcast & Communications Lawyers & Attorneys : Fletcher Heald & Hildreth Law Firm : Telecommunications, FCC Regulation, Communications Act

The majority opinion, written by Judge David Sentelle (with Judge Thomas Griffith joining him), relied on a standard statutory analysis of the FCC’s decision, an approach in which the Court accords a boatload of deference to the agency. As usually happens when the Court takes that deferential tack, the FCC got the benefit of the doubt: the majority held that the Commission was not unreasonable in its conclusion that the prohibition is still justified, even though a different panel of the Court had held, in an unrelated case decided last August, that “[c]able operators [ . . . ] no longer have the bottleneck power over programming that concerned the Congress in 1992.” (We blogged about that case, which involves the FCC’s ownership caps, here.)

But the victory may not comfort the Commission (or others supporting the prohibition) much.  The majority wrapped up its opinion by observing that “[w]e expect that if the [MVPD] market continues to evolve at such a rapid pace, the Commission will soon be able to conclude that the exclusivity prohibition is no longer necessary to preserve and protect competition and diversity in the distribution of video programming.”  In other words, while the Court was willing to give the FCC a pass this time around, the Commission shouldn’t necessarily count on similar treatment the next time around.

An interesting aspect of the majority opinion is that it rejected the cable petitioners’ claims that, rather than the lenient, deferential statutory standard of review invoked by the majority, a more rigorous, less-agency-friendly First Amendment standard should apply because the cable operators’ First Amendment rights were (according to the petitioners, at least) at stake. The majority declined to consider any First Amendment arguments because, according to Sentelle, the cable guys didn’t raise them. 

That was news to Judge Brett Kavanaugh, whose 29-page dissent – not quite twice as long as the majority opinion – relied heavily on First Amendment analysis to reach the conclusion that the FCC’s prohibition is unconstitutional.  In the majority’s view, the cable petitioners never squarely argued that theirs was a First Amendment attack, and (according to the majority) the Court should not be in the business of deciding issues of constitutionality which the petitioner did not “set forth as an issue in the case and to which it refers only obliquely.”  [Important practice tip: If you plan to argue a constitutional issue, be sure to refer to the Constitution in your Statement of Issues.]  In fairness, while Kavanaugh makes a big effort to “tease out” (in Sentelle’s words) enough constitutional references in the petitioner’s briefs to cobble together an argument, it does appear that the cable guys declined to present the constitutional issue as such.

For their part, while the cable petitioners may take considerable comfort from Judge Kavanaugh’s  constitutional analysis, even he had to acknowledge that “the First Amendment rights of a Cablevision or ESPN do not tug at the free speech heartstrings in the same way as the iconic political protester who lies at the core of the First Amendment.”  Ouch.

Next stop? The ball is in Cablevision/Comcast’s court. They could sit back and wait for the current extension to expire (in 2012) and see what the FCC does. Or they could continue their litigation by seeking either: (a) reconsideration by the Sentelle/Griffith/Kavanaugh panel; or (b) rehearing en banc by the full D.C. Circuit; or (c) review by the Supreme Court. 

The odds of success in pursuing any of those options tend to be long against the guy seeking review. However, consider these facts. First, the cable petitioners have the advantage of a very thoughtful dissent on their side, reflecting at least one judge’s approval of their First Amendment arguments.  That might be helpful in persuading Kavanuagh’s colleagues that those arguments have merit.  Second, another panel of the Circuit did issue that decision on the cable ownership caps just last August, containing language that could easily be viewed as inconsistent with (or at least in strong tension with) the more recent ruling.  The full Circuit might be inclined to look at that aspect to confirm that the Court’s rulings are not heading in opposite directions.  And if cable’s goal is really to get the Supreme Court to revisit the issue of cable’s First Amendment rights – an issue last decided  there more than a decade ago, by a slim 5-4 vote – Cablevision and/or Comcast may figure that the Supremes might want to take a look (particularly in view of Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent).

Even if the cable petitioners pursue their litigation successfully, though, it’s possible that that litigation won’t be resolved until 2011 or even 2012. And at that point, the prohibition against exclusivity will be expiring anyway . . . unless the Commission decides otherwise. 

[Department of Credit-where-credit-is-due: FHH’s own Paul Feldman represented the Broadband Service Providers Association as an amicus on the FCC’s side before the Circuit in this case.]

For the proper disposition of this case, should the Court overrule either or both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and the part of McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), which addresses the facial validity of Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. §441b?

For readers unaccustomed to the patois of high-falutin’ constitutional litigators, a “facial” challenge is the classic blunt instrument, a broadside attack in which an entire statutory scheme is targeted. The alternative to a “facial” attack is an “as applied” attack, in which the party challenges not the entire statute, but rather just that portion of the statute that has been applied to the challenger. To analogize to the surgical arena, an “as applied” attack is akin to delicate laparoscopic surgery involving cute little incisions leaving minimal scars; a “facial” challenge is akin to Civil War battlefield amputations (think the hospital scene in Gone with the Wind).

Not surprisingly, courts tend to prefer the “as applied” approach – so it’s a big deal when the Supreme Court itself announces that it’s prepared to consider arguments about the facial validity of a statute.

When we discussed the Court's most recent pronouncement on BCRA (Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.), we took particular note that  Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Kennedy, would have declared BCRA unconstitutional, and that Justice Alito was moving in that direction.  With its order in the Citizens United, the Court could be indicating that another Justice or two may be ready to toss all, or at least a major chunk, of BCRA. (Note that the oral argument has been set for September 9, which in itself is highly unusual. Ordinarily, the Court recesses from the end of June until the first Monday in October.)

Betamax 2009

The Court's next big statement consisting of few words was the simple denial of certiorari in a case (Cable News Network v. CSC Holdings, No. 08-448) brought by several television networks and Hollywood studios against Cablevision. The nets and studios claimed that Cablevision's remote storage DVR (RS-DVR) system violates their copyrights by making an unauthorized copy at the cable system’s headend. Of course, the alternative to an RS-DVR system entails making the recordings on about a gazillion separate set-top DVR boxes located in the cable subscribers’ homes. The RS-DVR approach merely shifts the locus of the mechanical recording to a more efficient, centrally-located facility, while providing the end-user precisely the same end-result – the ability to view video content of the viewer’s choosing at a time and place convenient to the viewer.

The networks and studios initially won their case in United States District Court, convincing that court that Cablevision's system constituted a copyright violation.  Cablevision countered that there was no effective difference between (a) this cheaper method of storing content and (b) the use of multiple set-top DVR units. Since the latter approach was directly analogous to reliance on separate VCRs, and since individualized, private-use VCR recording had been held not to constitute copyright infringement, Cablevision prevailed on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  The nets and studios asked the Supremes to review the Second Circuit’s decision, and the Supremes have now declined the opportunity with the standard, brutally unilluminating, nine-sentence order (“The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.”). That leaves the Second Circuit decision in place and Cablevision’s RS-DVR system alive and kicking.

This becomes the latest in a long line of cases, dating back to the Court's 1984 decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (the "Betamax" case), that allow for "time shifting" of television programs by a viewer for his or her later viewing in his or her own home.  It is expected to increase the use of cable set-top boxes with DVRs, which will, in turn, impact the advertising revenues collected by television networks.